FIA has updated its CCP Tracker visualizations with data from the second quarter.
The CCP Tracker visualizations show risk-related metrics for 15 clearinghouses side by side for each quarter going back to 2015. The metrics include initial margin, default funds, margin breaches, stress losses and concentration ratios. The data were obtained from the public quantitative disclosures published by the clearinghouses, which are generally released two or three months after the end of the quarter.
Highlights of the second quarter:
Initial margin functions as the first line of defense in case of a default. In the second quarter,
Taking the view down to the service level:
The default fund functions as a backstop in case a clearing member is unable to meet its obligations and its initial margin proves insufficient. Most default funds rely primarily from contributions from member firms, with some additional funding provided by the clearinghouse itself.
Many clearinghouses contribute their own funds, called "skin in the game", to an initial layer of protection that absorbs losses before the default fund is used.
The FIA CCP Tracker includes data on the largest margin breach over the prior 12 months. Margin breaches are measured at the member level, not the customer level, and represent the potential exposure to losses not covered by initial margin (i.e. where variation margin losses exceed the initial margin requirement for a particular member).
The largest margin breach over the 12 months ending in June was reported by LCH Ltd. That breach was £625.5 million ($791 million) in its interest rates clearing service. ICE Clear Europe reported the second highest margin breach, $85.1 million in its clearing service for futures and options. The third highest breach occurred at Eurex in its clearing service for equity derivatives with €46.6 million ($49.9 million) at quarter-end.
CME had the lowest margin breach relative to other large CCPs. The peak margin breach reported in its second quarter disclosure was $558,426 for its "base" clearing service, which covers its exchange-traded futures and options. This was the same as the previous and lower than the prior two quarters, meaning that this breach could have occurred anywhere within the third quarter of 2023 to the first quarter of 2024.
This section of the FIA CCP Tracker shows data on stress losses, which are defined as a CCP's estimate of the potential loss in case of a default by a single member and by two members at the same time.
FIA also calculates the ratio of the stress loss to the default fund as a way to gauge how much of the loss the surviving clearing members might have to absorb.
ICE's clearing services for credit default swaps had the lowest ratios of a single exposure to the default fund, just 0.1 for ICE Clear Credit in the US. ICE's futures and options clearing services also had relatively low ratios, 0.8 for ICE Clear Europe and 0.5 for ICE Clear US.
At the other end of the spectrum, the three clearing services operated by Hong Exchanges and Clearing -- HKCC, OTC Clearing, and SEOCH -- had ratios of 1.2, 1.2, and 1.4 respectively. Seven of JSCC’s clearing services exhibited ratios greater than 1. In particular, the precious metals, the agriculture, and the rubber services had high ratios, with ratios of 2.4, 3.1, and 7.4 respectively.
This section of the FIA CCP Tracker includes data on the number of general clearing members at each clearinghouse. General clearing members, also known as futures commission merchants in the US, are those members that provide clearing for clients and affiliates. Some clearinghouses also have direct members that clear only their own positions.
The CCP Tracker also includes data on concentration ratios, i.e., the ratio of initial margin held by the top five members. The following table shows the IM concentration ratios during the second quarter for a sample set of CCPs.